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Land reform was launched in the Republic of Georgia in 1992, about a year after the 
country gained its independence from the Soviet Union. While an impressive land 
individualization process has been in effect since then, the pace and the performance of 
this process are far from satisfactory. This is due to a combination of institutional and 
economic constraints. We use comparable survey data from 1996 and 2003 and show 
that the land reform has been progressing mainly through land leasing. This allows 
successful farm households to expand their farming operation and improve their 
well-being. Land documentation doesn’t seem to yield the expected results, and the 
blame may be on less than sufficient labor and credit opportunities. We conclude that 
there is scope for continuing the process of land reform in Georgia, but this has to be 
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Introduction 
  Agriculture has traditionally been an important sector of the Georgian 
economy. After independence in 1991, the agricultural sector underwent a severe crisis, 
mainly due to the civil war, which resulted in the destruction of the productive ability 
of collective and state farms. A process of land individualization has been in effect 
since then, with agricultural land being distributed to private households. Land 
individualization was composed of two different mechanisms: privatization and leasing. 
A program of land privatization was initiated in 1992, involving an establishment of a 
“privatization reserve” of 850,000 hectares including 200,000 hectares already used by 
private farm families at that time and an additional 650,000 hectares from collective 
and state farms. This land was intended for allocation among existing and new family 
farms. By 1996, land held by private households grew by roughly 200% to a total of 
628,000 hectares (Lerman 1996). By 1997, this number grew further to 766,000 
hectares (Shuker 2000), and by April of 1999, to 918,000 hectares (FAO 1999).   
In addition, private households leased more land from state reserves. In 1996, 
the government of Georgia permitted the leasing of agricultural land still under 
government control to private households or legal entities. By 1997, the amount of land 
leased to producers was almost equal to the amount held privately (Shuker 2000). Still,   3
about half of the agricultural land in Georgia remains under the control of state 
agencies, which do not use it productively. 
The resulting structure of the farm sector is composed of three types of farms. 
First, there are the small family farms, cultivating 0.75 hectares of land on average, that 
do not lease land. Second, there are the larger individual farms that lease land and 
cultivate 6 hectares on average. These are perhaps the more ambitious and also possibly 
better connected farmers. Finally, there are the large entities that cultivate close to 100 
hectares on average, almost all of it leased (Shuker 2000). In fact, it turns out that the 
large entities tend not to cultivate all their leased land, mainly because of capital 
constraints (FAO 1999). They may be leasing the land in part for speculative reasons. 
Institutional factors impose considerable limitations on the functioning of the 
land market. Private land is restricted to a maximum of 1.5 hectares per household. The 
distribution of both privatized and leased land was at the hands of the Sakrebulo 
(representative body of local government). There seems to be huge variation across 
Sakrebulos in the fraction of land distributed to private hands (Lerman 1996). In 
addition, not all land transfers are formally complete. A transfer is only complete once 
the state issues a transfer certificate called a “giving and receiving act.” A large number 
of small farmers are still without certificates, which means that they cannot sell the land   4
to others or use it as collateral in the capital market. Moreover, land sales between 
private farmers within a Sakrebulo are allowed only after all agricultural land in the 
Sakrebulo is systematically registered, a restriction that practically prohibits all private 
land transactions as of today (Shuker 2000). 
These institutional constraints result in an inefficient use of agricultural land in 
Georgia. On one hand, efficient and successful small farmers cannot expand their 
landholdings, and cannot utilize their potential and grow into commercial farming 
operations. On the other hand, inefficient small farmers cannot exit and inefficient large 
farmers cannot reduce their size since they cannot get compensated for the land and 
also perhaps lack of economic alternatives. At the macro level, eliminating the 
institutional constraints in the land market and continuing the individualization process 
(including privatization and land leasing) would very likely result in a land distribution 
that includes a much larger fraction of mid-size family farms. Much more of the 
agricultural land in Georgia will be cultivated, and crop yields will be higher. These 
have been found to be the results of land reforms in many developing countries 
(Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995). Land registration that will enable private land 
to be used as collateral will have indirect effects on agricultural productivity through 
the alleviation of capital market constraints (Feder, Onchan and Raparla 1988).   5
Moreover, established property rights may increase the incentives of farmers to make 
costly long-run investments (Besley 1995), thereby promoting prospects for further 
long-run growth of the agricultural sector. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the progress of the land reform 
between the years 1996 and 2003 and assess its consequences for the well being of the 
rural population. We use data derived from two farm-household surveys conducted in 
1996 and 2003 in four districts surrounding the capital city of Tbilisi. The surveys 
collected information about the demographic profile of the household, household 
income and its sources, land resources and other farm assets, farming activity and 
related activities (finances, investments), and social aspects (Gogodze et al. 2005). In 
the next section we describe the progress of the land reform, and after that we examine 
the changes in household income. Then, we analyze the association between land 
reform and household income through a multiple regression analysis. We conclude with 
a discussion of the policy implications of our results. 
 
The progress of land reform 
Figure 1 portrays the changes in farm-size distribution between 1996 and 2003. 
It is evident that the distribution has shifted to the right, implying that farms are larger   6
in 2003 than in 1996. This is attributed mainly to a significant increase in the amount of 
leased land. While the size of land owned by a typical farm has grown from 0.74 ha in 
1996 to 0.81 ha in 2003, an average farm rents about 0.77 ha in 2003 relative to only 
0.16 ha in 1996. Only 2% of the farms leased land in 1996, while this fraction increased 
to 12% in 2003. On average, a farm that leased land in 1996 owned 0.85 ha, while an 
average farm that did not lease land owned 0.73 ha. These numbers have changed to 
0.66 ha and 0.84 ha, respectively, in 2003. The number of plots cultivated by each 
family has increased from 1996 to 2003. In 1996, 74% of families cultivated up to two 
plots. This fraction decreased to 61% in 2003. In 2003, 70% of farmers possess some 
land ownership document, an increase of 30% relative to 1996. 
In summary, the progress of land reform from 1996 to 2003 is expressed 
mainly in the possibility to lease land. This possibility is utilized by a relatively small 
number of farmers, perhaps due to constraints on the availability of credit or labor. This 
probably leads to increased inequality among farmers. In addition, the increased 
possession of land ownership documents might lead, in the long run, to an increase in 
the ability of small farmers to raise credit. 
 
The changes in household income   7
  Since the average cultivated land increased from 1996 to 2003, one would 
expect an increase in farm production. However, this is difficult to measure because 
farmers grow many different types of crops and the composition of crops also changed 
between 1996 and 2003. For example, because rented land tends to be marginal, there 
has been an increase in the cultivation of hay, a marginal crop. Also, the yield of several 
crops dropped considerably between 1996 and 2003. This could be because of natural 
conditions, but inputs of production other than land may be important as well. Georgian 
farmers rely mostly on family labor and hence may face labor shortages when 
increasing the cultivated land. However, the average number of workers per farm 
increased from 2.65 in 1996 to 4.07 in 2003. On the other hand, only 13.5% of farmers 
used purchased inputs in 2003, compared to 25% in 1996. This may explain the drop in 
yields. 
  The value of farm production depends not only on cultivated land and crop 
yields but also on prices. The data show that crop prices dropped dramatically (in real 
terms) from 1996 to 2003. This has led to a 50% drop in the value of crop production. 
The value of livestock production remained roughly the same, and the total value of 
farm production dropped by about 25% from 1996 to 2003 (figure 2). Farm products 
may be used for self consumption, sold, or reserved. In rural Georgia, most farmers still   8
consume all their farm output (Kan et al. 2006). The fraction of output consumed 
increased from 66% in 1996 to 72% in 2003. This means that household cash income 
suffered even more in 2003. 
  In 2003, farm income, while being the most important source of household 
income, constituted less than 50% of total household income (figure 3). Non-farm labor 
and business income combined for about a third, and the rest came through public and 
private transfers. While we do not have these statistics for 1996, we do have a report on 
the fraction of farm income in total household income in both years (figure 4). We 
observe that the share of farm income has increased, on average, from 1996 to 2003. 
Combined with our earlier observation that farm income has decreased over the same 
period, we conclude that the decline in total household income was even more extreme 
than the decline in farm income alone. 
 
Land reform and household income 
  It would not be correct to blame the decline in household income on the land 
reform. Farm household situation is determined, in general, by a combination of 
technological factors, market conditions and policy, as well as the household’s own 
decisions. The discussion above implied that market conditions had perhaps the most   9
significant negative effect on household income. Hence, it could very well be that the 
marginal effect of land reform on household income is in fact positive. This is 
supported by the results of Kan et al. (2006), who showed that landholdings have a 
positive effect on the tendency of farmers to sell their farm products on the market. 
Moreover, we have seen that most of the increase in landholdings has been achieved 
through leased land, and hence is concentrated among a small number of farms. 
  In table 1 we compare several observed characteristics of households who 
lease land and those who do not, using the 2003 data. We observe that households who 
lease land have much higher farm incomes, but also considerably higher non-farm 
incomes. Remittances and social payments are lower for households who lease land, 
but these constitute a relatively small fraction of household income. Overall, total 
income of households who lease land is more than twice that of households who do not, 
on average. As mentioned before, households who lease land own less land of their 
own, but the leased land more than compensates for that. Those households also have 
more farm assets, and are more likely to own livestock. On the other hand, they are less 
likely to hold a land ownership document, and their plots are more remote. In addition, 
farmers who lease land tend to be somewhat younger and more educated, and have 
larger families.   10
  In order to find the marginal effects of the land-reform-sensitive variables on 
household income, we conduct a multivariate regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of per-capita household income (hereafter income), 
hence the coefficients can be interpreted as percentage changes in income caused by a 
unit change in each explanatory variable. The analysis is conducted first for the whole 
sample, and then repeated for households who do not lease land, in order to confirm 
that the results are not driven solely by the vast differences between households who 
lease and those who do not lease land that were discussed above. The results are in 
table 2. We find that an additional hectare of owned land can increase income by more 
than 5%, while a similar increase in leased land has an effect of less than 1% on income. 
This implies that the potential of increasing rural household income is much larger 
among households who own small plots rather than among those who operate larger 
land areas through leasing. This is consistent with the “inverse relationship” 
phenomenon (Kimhi 2006). Income is positively related to the number of plots, holding 
land constant. Land fragmentation is likely to have a negative effect on crop yields 
through plot-level economies of scale, but could also allow farmers to diversify their 
output mix and reduce yield uncertainty, and therefore allow them to grow more risky 
crops with higher mean yields. The latter effect seems to be dominant in this case. In   11
the whole sample, income is positively related to the distance to plots, but this effect 
vanishes in the sub-sample of households who do not lease land. This implies that the 
effect of distance is significant only among land-leasing households, perhaps because 
those households agree to rent remote plots only when they expect that these plots will 
yield higher incomes. Land quality has a positive effect on income, as one could expect, 
but the effect is not statistically significant. Households who hold a land document have 
lower incomes, and this effect holds even among households who do not lease land. 
One possible explanation for this counter-intuitive result is that households with land 
documents have more secure property rights on their land, and thereby undertake 
land-improving investments that should be profitable in the long run but may be costly 
in the short run (Besley 2005). 
  Households who own livestock enjoy almost 80% more income than those 
who do not. Holding farm assets increases income significantly, but the magnitude of 
the effect is rather small. Age and education of the head of household (human capital 
indicators) increase income significantly, as one may expect. However, the effect of 
education is not linear, with elementary education almost equivalent to academic 
education, and high school education no different from no schooling at all. This may 
reflect the highly imperfect labor markets in rural Georgia, where educated individuals   12
tend to be employed in the public sector and are willing to earn low wages in return for 
job security (Hoyman and Kimhi 2005). Larger households have lower per-capita 
income, which is a common result. We also observe regional income disparity, with 
higher income in Gardabani region and lower income in Sagarejo region, compared to 
the other two regions. 
 
Policy implications 
  What can we learn from these results on the prospects of land reform in the 
Republic of Georgia and perhaps more generally for transitional countries? The 
progress of land reform in Georgia was gradual and has not reached full coverage, 
mainly due to institutional complexities. We can think of the land reform as composed 
of three dimensions: allowing rural families to own one or more plots of land; allowing 
farm households to lease land from state enterprises; and land registration. We shall 
now discuss the merits of each dimension as reflected in our empirical results. 
  First, we found that the amount of land owned by rural households increase 
their per-capita income. This calls into question the logic of the institutional constraints 
on the amount of land allocated to each farmer. Supposedly, these constraints were 
aimed at allowing more households to obtain land, but it is not clear that the low   13
income gained by cultivating such small plots is better than the alternative. Second, 
land leasing seems to be a successful channel through which the more productive 
farmers can expand their farm operation. The land leased tends to be marginal in terms 
of its suitability to the most profitable crops, but its value at the state enterprises is 
close to zero, and it allows farmers to enjoy much higher incomes. Leasing is also 
subject to lower transactions costs, and hence it seems to be the most promising 
channel in which the land reform in Georgia should proceed. 
  Finally, we found that land documentation is associated with lower household 
income, even after removing households that lease land, that have higher income on 
average and are less likely to hold a land document. We do not see any reason that land 
registration in itself will cause lower household income in the long run. The main 
motivation for land registration as part of a land reform is to allow land transactions. 
This is necessary in order to allow evolutionary changes in land ownership, so that 
productive and efficient farmers could buy land from less productive and inefficient 
ones. Land documentation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for land 
transactions. Farmers who want to expand their landholdings must also have equity or 
access to credit. Neither sufficient equity not access to credit is likely to be prevalent in 
rural Georgia. The fact that landholdings variability in our sample is quite low tells us   14
that not many land transactions have been conducted so far, despite the fact that nearly 
75% of the farmers hold land documents. In this sense, land documentation is perhaps 
the least promising channel through which to promote land reform in Georgia. In this 
sense, the need for continued land reform cannot be disentangled from the need to 
develop other rural markets, such as the credit market. 
  Another rural market that needs to be taken care of is the labor market. This is 
relevant to our current discussion of the land reform in more than one way. First, 
increasing landholdings requires more farm labor, and above a certain threshold, family 
labor will not be sufficient and additional workers will have to be hired. Second, if 
some farmers are to give up all or part of their land, they should be able to find an 
alternative source of income, and the rural labor market will be the first choice. Without 
a well-functioning rural labor market, the response of farm households to the land 
reform will be limited. 
  A final aspect that needs to be discussed in the context of land reform is rural 
income inequality. Our findings indicate that the expansion of land leasing between 
1996 and 2003 has led to a higher polarization of household income. Naturally, 
continuing the reform will expand this trend, especially if the availability of alternative 
income sources is far from satisfactory. It has been shown for many countries that   15
off-farm income allows poor farmers to keep up with the more affluent ones (see for 
example Arayama et al. 2006 and the references therein). In the case of Georgia, 
continuing the momentum of the land reform without developing rural labor markets 
could increase rural income inequality and raise rural poverty, at least in the relative 
sense. 
  To summarize, our findings indicate that the potential of increased land market 
activity is still there. A continuing specialization process that will enable successful 
farmers to acquire more land could improve the economic well-being of farm families 
even in a period of depressed produce prices. As has been shown by Zimmerman 
(2000) for South Africa, other rural markets, including the credit market and the labor 
market, need to be developed concurrently in order to allow farmers to take full 
advantage of the opportunities opened by the land reform, and in order to avoid 





Arayama, Yuko, Jong Moo Kim, and Ayal Kimhi. Determinants of Income Inequality 
among Korean Farm Households. Center for Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 
161, School of Economics, Nagoya University. November 2006. 
 
Besley, Timothy. “Property-Rights and Investment Incentives - Theory and Evidence 
from Ghana.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (5), October 1995, p. 903-937.   16
 
Binswanger, Hans P., Klaus Deininger, and Gershon Feder. “Power, Distortions, Revolt 
and Reform in Agricultural Land Relations.” Handbook of Development Economics, 
Vol. IIIB, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1995. 
 
FAO. Crop and Food Supply Situation in Georgia, Special Report, December 1999. 
 
Feder, Gershon, Tongroj Onchan, and Tejaswi Raparla. “Collateral, Guarantees and 
Rural Credit in Developing Countries: Evidence from Asia.” Agricultural Economics 2, 
1988, p. 231-45. 
Gogodze, Josefh, Iddo Kan, and Ayal Kimhi. Development of individual farming in 
Georgia: descriptive analysis and comparisons. In Josefh Gogodze and Ayal Kimhi, eds., 
Privatization, liberalization, and the emergence of private farms in Georgia and other 
former Soviet countries. Tbilisi, Georgia: Color Publishing House, 2005, p. 9-38. 
Hoyman, Ofir, and Ayal Kimhi. “Off-Farm Labor Supply in Rural Georgia.” In Joseph 
Gogodze and Ayal Kimhi, eds., Privatization, Liberalization, and the Emergence of 
Private Farms in Georgia and Other Former Soviet Countries. Tbilisi, Georgia: Color 
Publishing House, 2005, pp. 80-96. 
 
Kan, Iddo, Ayal Kimhi, and Zvi Lerman.  Farm Output, Non-Farm Income, and 
Commercialization in Rural Georgia. Discussion Paper No. 16.06, The Center for 
Agricultural Economic Research, Rehovot, Israel, December 2006. 
 
Kimhi, Ayal. “Plot Size and Maize Productivity in Zambia: Is There an Inverse 
Relationship?” Agricultural Economics 35 (1), July 2006, 1-9. 
 
Lerman, Zvi. Land Reform and Private Farms in Georgia: 1996 Status, EC4NR 
Agriculture Policy Note No. 6, October 1996. 
 
Shuker, Iain. Georgia: An Update of Agricultural Developments, Unpublished 
Manuscript, July 2000. 
 
Zimmerman, Fredrick J. “Barriers to Participation of the Poor in South Africa’s Land 
Redistribution.” World Development 28 (8), August 2000, p. 1439-60.   17
 









































































Figure 4 – The share of farm income in total household income 
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farm income (lari)  2792  6723 
non-farm income (lari)  1053  1487 
remittances (lari)  150  58 
social payments (lari)  122  76 
total income (lari)  4118  8344 
land owned (ha)  0.85  0.66 
land rented (ha)  0.00  6.49 
total land (ha)  0.85  7.15 
number of plots  2.37  3.02 
mean distance to plot (km)  1.49  3.30 
mean land quality (index)  3.17  3.18 
land document (dummy)  0.73  0.48 
livestock (dummy)  0.80  0.89 
farm assets (lari)  16314  23345 
age 45.49  42.41 
elementary education (dummy)  0.09  0.13 
higher education (dummy)  0.47  0.52 
professional education (dummy)  0.18  0.14 
academic education (dummy)  0.17  0.18 
family size  3.92  4.25 
________________________________________________________________   20
Table 2 - regression of per-capita household income (2003) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  All households  No leased land 
 _____________________  ____________________ 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
___________________________________________________________________
land owned  0.0520242 5.54 **  0.059046  5.08  **
land rented  0.0091638 5.82 **      
number of plots  0.1166889 7.87 **  0.104582 6.51  **
mean distance to plot  0.0227898 3.1 **  0.007492 0.82   
mean land quality  0.0205012 0.85   0.039745  1.57   
land document  -0.1149916 -3.21 **  -0.139310 -3.52  ** 
livestock 0.7938670 17.95 **  0.787893 17.05  ** 
farm assets  0.0369807 7.34 **  0.033248 6.1  ** 
age 0.0103551 6.45 **  0.010189 5.95  ** 
elementary education  0.3259938 2.45 *  0.423818  3.03  ** 
higher education  0.0074639 0.07   0.026756  0.23   
professional education  0.2388096 1.98 *  0.218347  1.76   
academic education  0.3438532 2.87 **  0.380922 3.07  ** 
family size  -0.1506635 -12.15 **  -0.158460 -11.83  ** 
Dusheti region  -0.0662070 -1.38   -0.066660  -1.37   
Sagarejo region  -0.1790063 -3.64 **  -0.169970 -2.99  ** 
Gardabani region  0.3564647 7.25 **  0.252332 4.91  ** 
intercept 5.2959180 33.42 **  5.353421 32.17  ** 
r-squared 0.2667      0.2518     
number of households  2486      2186     
____________________________________________________________________ 
  * coefficient significant at 5% 
  ** coefficient significant at 1% 
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